Against the background of these results, the present writer thinks that both the tide of the essay and its contents comain strange misreadings and criticisms. It is therefore the aim of this critique to identify these inadequacies. They lie in the following areas: Oguejiofor's exposition of Russell's theories of perception; misreadings or new interpretations of Russell's views; confusing and contradictory presentations; and whether or not Russell set out to solve the problem of perception in st.' . IS8 Reviews (3)
His evaluations of Russell's views are very critical. Such evaluations are found in the course of his expositions and at the conclusion of the entire essay. The critical character of the essay is portrayed in one of his concluding remarks thus: "Russell remains far away from the ideal of progress and clear cut solutions he wanted to offer to the problem of perception" (pp. . In the author's view, an ideal of this sort displays a lack of proper philosophical attitude. Hence, his conviction that "Russell failed to achieve his aim"-a failure that "points the way CO It is true that every author has a right to limit the scope of his work. At the same time he should be prepared to face criticisms which may ensue from related issues that are neglected in his survey especially if such issues are not just accidental reftrences, but are at the very heart of the discussion in question.
, Comment on the back cover of the essay.
• [At this point a very long examination ensues. For reasons of space, dare ofpublication and the relative importance of rhe book only rhe conclusion follows. -Ed.] 1 The said "insufficient recognition" is boldly acknowledged by Oguejiofor in his "Introduction": "[n presenting Russell's rheories, we are well aWare thar perception is an interdisciplinary problem, touching on physics. physiology and psychology. This essay is not intended to delve deeply intO these disciplines excepr incidenrally where Russell made references to them (especially physics)" (p. [4)·
Reviews
Equally important co note in this critique is this: our considerations so far do not mean that all of Russell's views on "perception" are valid. Russell himself would be shocked if any passionate Russellian should accord infallibility to his views. After all, he once said:
... we ought always to entertain our OpIniOns with some measure of doubt. I shouldn't wish people dogmatically to believe any philosophy, not even mine. No, I
think we should accept our philosophies with a measure of doubt. 4 Russell's observation in this text receives considerable insistence in his talks, for in another context (i.e. speaking of the practical use of his type of philosophy), he gives this advice to people:
I think nobody should be certain of anything. If you're certain, you're almost certainly wrong, because nothing deserves certainty, and so one should always hold one's beliefs with a certain element of doubt and one ought to be able to act vigorously in spite of the doubt. ... But in practical life one has to act upon probabilities, and what I should look to philosophy to do is to encourage people to act with vigour without complete certainty. 5 There is no doubt that this state of "uncertainty" (doubt or probability) about knowledge and in practical life should be uncomfortable to most people, especially because the human mind seeks after what is certain and what endures. Once, Russell was asked why he considers it important that we should act with such spirit of uncertainty or probability, since this attitude of uncertainty "is generally disturbing to people". He replied:
Well, it [i.e. acting with uncertainty] does for a time of course disturb them. I think a certain amount of disturbance is an essential part of a mental training, but if they have any knowledge of science they get a ballast which enables them to avoid being completely upset by the doubts that they ought to feel (Ibid) These concluding remarks are meant ro demonstrate that Russell's views (whether on perception or another philosophical problem) are not sacrosanct. At the same time, they do imply that JUSt any kind of treatise against Russell's views cannot be accepted as valid exposition or worthwhile criticism.
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